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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: GREEN AND KEYES FROM A UNITARY
STANDARD TO A DOUBLE STANDARD TO A
UNIFORM NATIONAL DE FACTO STANDARD
L. Darnell Weeden*
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue to be addressed is whether the Supreme Court has aban-
doned the affirmative duty to integrate public schools articulated in its
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Va.1 opinion forty
years ago in 1968. One could reasonably construe the logic and rationale
of the Green opinion as creating an affirmative duty on public school offi-
cials to dismantle the effects of the "separate but equal" racial doctrine in
public education. The "separate but equal" theory of racial discrimination
in public education was approved by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
in 1849 in Roberts v. City of Boston.2 In 1954, one of my heroes, Thurgood
Marshall, an excellent advocate of social justice and racial equality, per-
suaded the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education3
to reject the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education.
Justice Lewis Powell of the United States Supreme Court said, "Thurgood
Marshall's record as an advocate for civil rights has no parallel."4 In 1936,
while working for the National Association for Advancement of Colored
People ("NAACP") pro bono, Marshall won his first significant case by
gaining law school admission for the first black law student at the Univer-
sity of Maryland.5
Part I of this article discusses Thurgood Marshall's exposure to racial
discrimination in education prior to becoming a law student, and also Mar-
shall's subsequent total commitment to integration in every aspect of public
education. Part II evaluates the Green opinion and its "affirmative duty to
integrate" rationale in de jure southern jurisdictions where racial segrega-
tion was historically required by law. Part III approaches the Keyes deci-
sion and examines how racially identifiable schools in the northern states
* Associate Dean and Roberson King Professor, Thurgood Marshall School Of Law, Texas
Southern University; B.A., J.D., University Of Mississippi. The author would like to thank Sally Green
Assistant Professor of Law and Charsalynn Mitchell Research Assistant Class of 2008 both of
Thurgood Marshall School Of Law for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am
grateful to my wife and our children for their moral support while I worked on this article.
1. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
2. 59 Mass. 198 (Mass. 1849).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Lewis F. Powell, Jr, Tribute to Justice: Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1229 (1992).
5. Id. (citing Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936)).
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with no history of requiring schools to follow the "separate but equal" doc-
trine may have created a dual educational system in violation of the su-
preme court's "affirmative duty to integrate" mandate articulated in Green.
Part IV considers how the Supreme Court implicitly abandoned the rem-
edy announced in Green, namely, the "affirmative duty to integrate" public
schools to achieve unitary schools.
1I. THURGOOD MARSHALL'S EXPOSURE To RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN EDUCATION PRIOR To BECOMING A LAW STUDENT INSPIRED His
SUBSEQUENT TOTAL COMMITMENT To INTEGRATION IN EVERY ASPECT
OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
Professor James L. Hunt does an excellent job of describing the revo-
lutionary nature of and the impact that the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education had on the Southern white lifes-
tyle, by rejecting racial discrimination in public education.6 The meaning
of Brown should not be downgraded to the litigation among the parties or
the decision of the United States Supreme Court.7 In order to fully under-
stand the implications of Brown, one must share the experience of the indi-
viduals, who would either treat the Brown opinion with contempt or
defend the opinion as the correct moral outcome.8 The Brown decision is
often regarded as an opinion with political underpinnings that demands an
analysis of its "impact at the local level" and in the case of Thurgood Mar-
shall, at the personal level.9 One of the goals in studying both Brown and
Justice Thurgood Marshall together is to join official legal progress with
wide-ranging ideas in society about race, law, and politics.1 °
Macon, Georgia, in many respects, was a typical segregated Southern
city in 1954.11 Law and "tradition" compelled every element of life, which
included public schools, employment, higher education, and churches, to be
segregated by race."2 "Like slavery, segregation operated through a com-
plex and interrelated set of rules, each of which depended in some manner
upon the others' enforcement."' 3 As soon as the United States Supreme
Court on May 17, 1954, decided in Brown that the "separate but equal"
race-based segregation in public elementary and secondary education was
illegal under the United States Constitution, the total structure of white
supremacy, a system put in power by law in Macon and other Southern
6. James L. Hunt, Brown v. Board of Education After Fifty Years: Context and Synopsis, 52
MERCER L. REV. 549 (2001) (citing 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 549-50.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Hunt, supra note 6, at 550 (citation omitted).
13. Id.
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communities, was subject to legal challenge. 4 White citizens in Macon im-
mediately understood Brown's capacity to disrupt the settled order of
white supremacy and the practice of "separate but equal.
'15
Macon symbolized the typical Southern society that was radically im-
pacted by Brown. It included a sizeable African-American population;
more than one-third of the total population. 6 Macon whites forcefully
preserved segregation in all phases of the city's social, economic, and edu-
cational realms. 7 Race was the primary factor in deciding one's neighbor-
hood, school, occupation, income, and church. Race was the controlling
factor in either providing or denying access to helpful institutions and pro-
ductive professions. 8 Racial segregation was equated with unchanging
"heritage." 9 "Realizing the revolution that was at hand after Brown,
white citizens desperately defended Southern 'traditions.'"20
The University of Maryland School of Law had refused to admit Mar-
shall to its first-year class.2" Professor Alfred A. Slocum believes that Mar-
shall's denial of admission by the University of Maryland inspired Marshall
to develop the legal talent necessary to create a new legal landscape for the
civil rights movement.22 Marshall left the state of Maryland to attend
Howard University School of Law in Washington, D.C., where he met
Charles Hamilton Houston, a law professor and Vice-Dean23 who would
become his mentor on how to use the law as a tool to promote racial and
social justice.24
As Marshall's mentor, Houston, was motivated to study law because
he thought law could be utilized as a tool for social engineering to chal-
lenge a legal system that allowed white children to ride to school on a bus,
while similarly situated black children had to walk.25 Houston's objection
to racial discrimination extended far beyond inequity in transporting chil-
dren to school.26 Rather, Houston suffered pain because of the damage to
the black children's psyches as privileged white children were given a ride
on the school bus that was denied to black children.27 Houston was deter-
mined to use the pain caused by racial segregation to teach jurisprudence at
14. Id. (citation omitted).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 556.
17. Id.
18. Hunt, supra note 6, at 556.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Powell, supra note 4.
22. Alfred A. Slocum, "I Dissent": A Tribute To Justice Thurgood MarshallL, 45 RUTGERS L.
REV. 889, 891 (1993).
23. Id. (citing GENNA R. McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTs 24 (1983)).
24. Id. (citing Randall Bland, Private Pressure on Public Law (1973) (dissertation, University of
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Howard that challenged Marshall and his law student peers to skillfully use
legal concepts to establish truth and justice for every one living in America
without regard to the color of his or her skin.28
Marshall's legendary status as a civil rights lawyer is closely identified
with the personal discrimination he suffered in education because of school
segregation.29 In Sweat v. Painter,3 Marshall effectively convinced the
Court to require the University of Texas Law School to admit African-
American law students. The Supreme Court's denunciation of the Plessy v.
Ferguson "separate but equal" theory at the law school level laid the
groundwork for Brown v. Board of Education.3 "In Brown, Thurgood
Marshall won his most famous victory, the result of which-the invalida-
tion of government-imposed school segregation-assured him a prominent
place in the history of our country.
3 2
Professor Wendy Brown-Scott has correctly stated that an examination
of Justice Marshall's way of life and the jurisprudence he cultivated in
school desegregation cases shows a faithful and dependable devotion to the
integrative model.33 Professor Brown-Scott utilized the expressions "in-
tegrative" and "integrationism" to illustrate the plan for establishing equal-
ity for members of racial and cultural minority groups in the United States
by expanding the potential for those minority groups to racially blend with
white Americans.34 "In its most radical form, integrationism results in the
virtual assimilation of the minority group into the dominant culture."35
Marshall possessed an undying conviction that the "integrative ideal" was
the best way for African Americans to win equal treatment under the
law.36 As a direct result of his strong belief in the integrationism model,
"in school desegregation cases, Marshall faithfully advocated for disman-
tling segregated systems of public education and making affirmative efforts
to racially integrate schools."37
After the Supreme Court rejected the "separate but equal" doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson, the real question of how to effectively end the effects of
racial segregation that were established and implemented by a state under
the "separate but equal" theory had to be addressed by the Supreme
Court.
28. Id. at 891-92.
29. Powell, supra note 4.
30. Id. (citing 339 U.S. 629 (1950)).
31. Id. (citations omitted).
32. Id.





37. Id. (citations omitted).
[VOL. 27:293
2008] JUSTICE MARSHALL AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 297
III. THE GREEN OPINION AND ITS "AFFIRMATIVE DuTY To
INTEGRATE" RATIONALE IN DE JURE SOUTHERN JURISDICTIONS WHERE
RACIAL SEGREGATION WAS HISTORICALLY REQUIRED By LAW
A close analysis of the Green opinion and its "affirmative duty to inte-
grate" schools with a history of de jure segregation and discrimination
based on race represents a dream opinion by the Supreme Court for Justice
Marshall and the supporters of the integration model for public education.
Green created an affirmative duty to integrate that is much more expansive
and challenging than a simple prohibition against discrimination on the ba-
sis of race.
According to Mr. Justice Brennan, who delivered the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Green, the issue was whether a Virginia School Board's
implementation of a "freedom-of-choice" plan permitting a student to se-
lect the specific public school of her choice fulfills the Board's constitu-
tional obligation to develop a race-neutral system for admitting students to
a public school, as required by the Brown decision.3" In holding that a state
could not comply with Brown's requirement to end racial segregation in
public schools under a "freedom-of-choice" plan, the Supreme Court may
have inadvertently killed a pragmatic means of integrating schools in the
South and throughout the nation. Southerners, who were, on the whole,
very opposed to any form of racial integration in public schools, no doubt
considered that it was a very practical and pragmatic concession to allow
those blacks, who wanted to attend historically all white schools, to attend
them, and that the concession was a necessary evil in order to protect their
right to receive federal dollars to support local education. The Supreme
Court's demand that both white and black schools be dismantled in favor
of unitary schools that could not be identified on the basis of race was more
than most Southern whites could tolerate. In other words, white
Southerners could tolerate the idea that it may be appropriate to allow
blacks to attend a white school that remained predominantly white, but
they could not accept the concept of a race-neutral unitary school that
posed a real risk of robbing white students of their white identity by being
assigned to a unitary school that was a de facto predominantly black
school.
In 1965, eleven years after the Brown opinion, the plaintiffs in the
Brown case filed suit asking for injunctive relief against the School Board
because it was operating a racially segregated school system in New Kent
County in rural Eastern Virginia.3 9 Approximately fifty percent of its total
population of 4,500 was African American. New Kent County was without
residential segregation, and members of both races lived throughout the
county.4 0 The school system consisted of two schools, New Kent School in
the eastern section of the county, and George W. Watkins School located in
38. Green, 391 U.S. at 431-32.
39. Id. at 432.
40. Id.
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the western part of the county.4" Of approximately 1,300 students who at-
tended the two county schools, 740 students were African-American and
550 students were White.42 The school district consisted of one white
united elementary and high school (New Kent) and one shared African
American elementary and high school (George W. Watkins). New Kent
County did not have attendance zones.43 The districts for both schools op-
erated throughout the whole county.4 4 Twenty-one school buses provided
transportation for the two schools with overlapping countywide routes.45
The New Kent County segregated school system was instituted and upheld
under Virginia constitutional and statutory terms requiring racial segrega-
tion in public schools.46 Although any Virginia law requiring racial segre-
gation was held unconstitutional in 1954, the New Kent County School
Board continued its segregated schools under the authority of laws enacted
by Virginia after the Brown decision to show that Virginia was opposed to
integration, notwithstanding the Court's holding in Brown.47 On August 2,
1965, five months following the start of the lawsuit against New Kent
County School Board, school officials were inspired to implement a free-
dom of choice desegregation plan so that the school district could continue
to qualify for federal financial assistance.48
The federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes different sections. 49 Title
VI prohibits racial discrimination by those receiving federal funds.50 Title
VI is associated with sections 601 and 602 of the Act.51 Section 601 prohib-
its racial discrimination in federally funded activities. 52 Section 602 em-
powers federal agencies to pass regulations to implement the prohibition
against racial discrimination.53
Under the "freedom-of-choice" plan in Virginia, each student, exclud-
ing incoming first and eighth graders, could, once a year, select between the
white New Kent and the black Watkins schools, and those students who
failed to choose a school were automatically assigned to the school they
formerly attended. Thus, under the "freedom-of-choice" plan, first and
eighth grade students had to affirmatively pick a school.54 The District




44. Green, 391 U.S. at 432.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 432-33.
48. Id. at 433.
49. Derek Black, Picking Up the Pieces After Alexander v. Sandova: Resurrecting a Private





54. Green, 391 U.S. at 433-34.
55. Id. at 434.
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's en-
dorsement of the New Kent County "freedom-of-choice" plan.
56
Before the Supreme Court's opinion in Green, the constitutional foot-
ing for the "freedom-of-choice" strategy was uncertain because the charac-
ter of the racial discrimination denounced in Brown was ambiguous. 7
Unlike some commentators, I maintain that Brown rejected racial discrimi-
nation in public schools based on the color of a child's skin. The clear
message of Brown to states is that "thou shall not refuse to admit a child to
a public school based on the color of her skin." A close reading of the
Brown opinion strongly suggests that it did not require states and school
boards to dismantle racially identifiable schools. Brown created an affirm-
ative duty on public school officials to stop denying admission to white
schools because of the color of a person's skin. I agree with the position
taken by the Fourth Circuit in Green that establishing a race-neutral free
choice plan complied with the requirements of Brown by not considering
the magnitude of the integration actually accomplished. 8 Unlike the
Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit,59 in a 1966 decision, and the Eighth Cir-
cuit, 60 in a 1968 opinion, concluded that desegregation must be defined by
integration and that the sufficiency of a "freedom-of-choice" plan had to be
evaluated by the totality of the integration resulting from the plan. The
example of separate 'white' and 'black' schools in New Kent County oper-
ating as required under state law is precisely the blueprint of segregation
Brown I and Brown II focus on, and which Brown I declared unconstitu-
tionally deprived black school children of equal protection under the law.61
The Supreme Court correctly accused public school officials in New
Kent County of operating a dual school system for blacks and whites that
encompassed segregation in every component of school functions-stu-
dents, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular events and services.
62
According to the Supreme Court, the New Kent County school system was
rendered unconstitutional by Brown I, and Brown II held that states must
56. Id.
57. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term - Free Choice and Free Transfer Plans for School Desegrega-
tion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 111, 112 (1968).
58. Id. at 112-13.
59. Id. at 113 (citing United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966),
affd with modifications on reh'g en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub nom. Caddo
Parish School Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Singleton v. Jackson Municipal School Dist.,
355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966)).
60. Id. (citing Kemp v. Beasley, 389 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1968); Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14,
20-21 (8th Cir. 1965); but see Kelley v. Altheimer School Dist., 378 F.2d 483, 490 (8th Cir. 1967) (reh'g
en banc denied) (rejection of request that school board be ordered to integrate classes immediately, the
court stating: ". . . we are not prepared to hold at this time ... that desegregation . . . cannot be
accomplished if students are permitted to attend the schools of their choice"); Clark v. Board of Educ.,
369 F.2d 661, 666 (8th Cir. 1966) ("[T]he constitutionality of [a desegregation] plan does not necessarily
depend upon favorable statistics indicating positive integration of the races .... The [free choice] system
is not subject to constitutional objection simply because large segments of whites and Negroes choose
to continue attending their familiar schools")).
61. Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
62. Id.
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abolish a racially identifiable dual operating public school system and tran-
sition to a school system free of racial discrimination.63 Immediately after
Brown II, the Supreme Court said it had a goal of rejecting the traditional
practice of preventing African-American children from entering schools at-
tended by white students of similar age.64 Under Brown II, the immediate
goal of allowing black children to be admitted to historically white public
schools was only a necessary first step.65 "The transition to a unitary, non-
racial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be brought
about."66 The 'complexities' associated with transitioning to a unitary sys-
tem of public education without racial discrimination or racial identifica-
tion inspired the Supreme Court to adopt an 'all deliberate speed'
approach to the implementation of the compulsory integration principles of
Brown I for those schools with an immediate history of operating a dual
race-based separate but equal public school system.67
I find it very problematic that the Supreme Court in Green would im-
pose a compulsory integration duty as opposed to an obligation to stop the
practice of excluding a student from a school of her choice based on race.
The unitary school rationale articulated by the Supreme Court was doomed
to fail because it required Southern Jim Crow states to take immediate
steps to desegregate by dismantling the racial identity of public schools.
No doubt, many Southerners in 1968 visiting the larger Northern cities of
Chicago and New York knew that although those two school systems did
not operate under the "separate but equal" requirements of Jim Crow laws,
they contain constitutionally permissible racially identifiable schools. I am
sure many Southerners were offended by the very idea that Northerners, or
those "damn" Yankees could maintain de facto segregated schools by the
simple expedient of freedom of providing "freedom-of-choice" or neigh-
borhood schools. The Green message, that unconstitutional segregation in
the South can continue under the equal protection clause even after public
officials stop discriminating against their former black slaves and allow
them to go to school with white children, was hard for many Southerners to
accept. Southerners in 1968 were confused and bitter about how white par-
ents in the North could virtually escape racial integrations in public schools
by simply admitting the small number of blacks who were actually available
to attend racially identifiable white schools by virtue of living in a white
neighborhood. Unlike Northern whites, Southern whites, because of
Green, were not given an opportunity to virtually escape integrated public
schools by implementing good faith race-neutral school policies in existing
predominantly white schools.
63. Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
64. Id. at 435-36.
65. Id. at 436.
66. Id.
67. Green, 391 U.S. at 436.
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Charles L. Zelden, an associate professor of History at Nova South-
eastern University, writes that the Green opinion unexpectedly and unin-
tentionally created a transformation in civil rights law in education.68 The
Green Court approached public school integration from the perspective of
group-based results rather than the right of the individual to attend the
school of her choice free of racial discrimination, even if that student is a
racial minority of one.69
Four cases70 written by Fifth Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom con-
cluded that although a "classification based on race is inherently discrimi-
natory and viola[tes] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, ' 71 it is not enough to stop discriminating on the basis of race
and to establish race-neutral admission criteria for admitting students in
public schools in order to satisfy an affirmative duty to promote integration
immediately. Judge Wisdom articulated the belief that "the only adequate
redress for a previously overt system-wide policy of segregation directed
against Negroes as a collective entity is a system-wide policy of integra-
tion."'72 The approach taken by Judge Wisdom and adopted by the Su-
preme Court in Green created an affirmative duty on public school officials
to classify students based on race in order to integrate schools immedi-
ately. 73 According to Judge Wisdom in Green, "[T]he time ha[d] come for
foot-dragging public school boards to move with clarity toward desegrega-
tion."74 The only relevant issue in school desegregation cases was "how far
have formerly de jure segregated schools progressed in performing their
affirmative constitutional duty to furnish equal educational opportunities
to all public school children," declared Judge Wisdom. 75 Under the inte-
gration vision presented by Judge Wisdom, any desegregation arrangement
that did not totally do away with the existing dual-system of "separate but
equal" education was a less than adequate plan; "Faculties, facilities and
activities as well as student bodies must be integrated, 76 under Judge Wis-
dom's vision. Judge Wisdom's advocacy in dismantling the dual system of
racially identifiable education that existed under the historically dual de
jure system practiced in the Southern states was later doomed to failure by
68. Charles L. Zelden, From Rights to Resources: The Southern Federal District Courts and the
Transformation of Civil Rights in Education, 1968-1974, 32 AKRON L. REV. 471, 486 (1999).
69. Id. at 471.
70. Id. (citing Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965) (herein-
after "Singleton I"); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966) (herein-
after Singleton /); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied sub. nom., Caddo Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) (hereinafter Jefferson I);
United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub. nom.,
Caddo Parish Sch. Bd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) (hereinafter "Jefferson II")).
71. Id. (quoting Dorsey v. State Athletic Comm'n, 168 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D. La, 1958) (Judge
Wisdom writing for a three-judge court)).
72. Id. (quoting Jefferson 1, 372 F. 2d at 836, 869).
73. Id. (citation omitted).
74. Zelden, supra note 68, at 483 (citing Jefferson I, 372 F.2d at 896) (quoting Singleton 1, 348
F.2d at 729).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 483-84.
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the Supreme Court. The Court concluded that racially identifiable schools
in Northern states with any history of "separate but equal" law in educa-
tion could be found to violate the equal protection clause prohibition
against a dual educational system if the school is found to have adopted
policies that promote de facto segregation. The Northern de facto system
of race based education with racially identifiable schools did not overtly
discriminate against students in the admission process, but any state-spon-
sored purpose promoting racial segregation in a school district may prevent
a school district outside the South from achieving Green's requirement of
integration of students.77
IV. THE KEYES DECISION AND How RACIALLY IDENTIFIABLE
SCHOOLS IN THE NORTHERN STATES WITH No HISTORY OF REQUIRING
SCHOOLS TO FOLLOW THE "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" DOCTRINE MAY
HAVE CREATED A DUAL EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN VIOLATION OF THE
SUPREME COURT'S AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INTEGRATE MANDATE
ARTICULATED IN GREEN
No doubt Northerners knew that if Southerners were required to dis-
mantle racially identifiable schools, that it probably was just a matter of
time before the Supreme Court would either extend the Green rationale of
no racially identifiable schools to the North at the request of either resent-
ful white Southerners or pro integrationist blacks. Five years after its
Green decision in 1973, the Supreme Court held in Keyes that the Denver,
Colorado school district, a school district outside of the South without a
history of de jure discrimination, could be liable for racial discrimination if
it could be established that school officials intentionally separated blacks
and Hispanics from whites in some of the schools in the district.78 The
Denver, Colorado schools had never functioned with either a constitutional
or statutory mandate to implement racial segregation in public education.79
In June 1969, parents of Denver schoolchildren filed a desegregation suit
alleging that the School Board used a variety of methods, including the
manipulation of student attendance zones, school site choices, as well as
neighborhood school guidelines, to either construct or preserve racially or
ethnically segregated schools in the school district, thereby giving plaintiffs
the right to seek a ruling directing desegregation of the whole school dis-
trict.80 Rather than extend the Green affirmative duty to integrate to all
public schools where segregation existed and segregation could be reduced
or eliminated to create a unitary school, the Supreme Court limited its af-
firmative duty to integrate public schools to those situations where the
challenger can demonstrate that the state has intentionally engaged in a
practice of racial discrimination and that the racial discrimination was a
77. Keyes v. School District No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 191.
80. Id.
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leading cause in creating a racially identifiable school without regards to
the geographical local of the school district.81
In the Keyes opinion, the Supreme Court does an excellent job of
describing how racial segregation may be implemented in those jurisdic-
tions like Colorado, where a statutory dual system was never needed to
maintain the existence of real world school segregation.82 In a state where
racial segregation by law has never existed, plaintiffs may prove that public
school officials have implemented a systematic policy of segregation touch-
ing a significant percentage of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities
inside the school district; it is only common sense to presume there exists a
basis for finding that dual school systems exists as a way of life in Denver
or other Northern cities.83
The Supreme Court identified factors that support the presumption of
a dual system of education as a way of life in the North.84 "First, it is obvi-
ous that a practice of concentrating Negroes in certain schools by structur-
ing attendance zones or designating 'feeder' schools on the basis of race
has the reciprocal effect of keeping other nearby schools predominantly
white."85 Second, the practice of building a school to a specific size and in
a definite location with substantial knowledge that the school serves a ra-
cially segregated population has the foreseeable effect of promoting racial
segregation in other nearby schools.86 Third, utilizing mobile classrooms,
preparing student transfer policies, student bus routes, as well as the assign-
ment of faculty and staff because of their race will have an impact on the
racial composition of residential neighborhoods, thereby creating racial
concentration or racial segregation within the schools.8 7
Under a theory of de facto dual segregation, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that Northern School districts may violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by implementing a practice of segre-
gation impacting a substantial part of the school district.88 Under Keyes v.
School District No. 1, proof of systemic racial segregation in schools pro-
duces a rebuttable presumption that a dual system is present.89 Once the
Court makes the determination that a dual system is present in a system
that did not require segregation by law, the defendant school district, under
the rationale of Keyes, has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to
overcome a presumption of a dual educational system.9"
Any school district operating a dual de jure system in 1954 had an
"affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
81. Id. at 189.




86. Id. at 201-02.
87. Id. at 202.
88. The Supreme Court, 1978 Term -The Scope of the Affirmative Duty to Desegregate Schools,
93 HARV. L. REV. 119, 120 (1979) (citing Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 456 (1979)).
89. Id. at 120.
90. Id. (citing Penick, 443 U.S. at 458).
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unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch." 91 The Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education92 stated that the affirmative duty requirement is not met if
one could identify white or black schools; the mere existence of black or
white schools created a prima facie constitutional violation, thereby author-
izing a court to grant an expansive integration remedy. 93 The drive toward
unitary schools that could not be identified as black or white was the begin-
ning of the end of the court's approval of school integration for integration
sake. Under the school "for integration sake" model, a school district pos-
sessing black and white schools was presumed to be in violation of the con-
stitution. Under Green's "thou shall integrate" approach, even if a school
system was free of racial discrimination because it was prospectively en-
forcing its policies prohibiting discrimination, the continuing existence of
schools identified as either black or white would create the presumption of
a continuing constitutional violation. For those taking part in the Green's
"thou shall integrate immediately" tactic, the only way to demonstrate that
a school system had cured its history of either de jure or de facto discrimi-
nation was to destroy any visible evidence of either white or black schools
by creating unitary schools free of any racial identity.
After the Brown v. Board of Education decision made racial segrega-
tion unconstitutional in public schools, courts and commentators failed to
reach a consensus about the constitutional set of guidelines essential to un-
derstanding the rationale in Brown.9 4 A number of people believed a vio-
lation occurred because of the way in which the racial segregation
occurred: unequivocal state sponsored racial discrimination. According to
the separate but equal interpretation, Brown recognized a constitutional
concept of equality before the law and advanced the goal of a colorblind
government. 95 The interpretation based on the rejection of the separate
but equal theory made a distinction between unconstitutional de jure racial
segregation in public schools required by law and constitutionally accept-
able de facto segregation, which occurs for reasons other than governmen-
tal conduct.
96
A different school of thought believed that Brown supported the the-
ory that all "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 97
Under the "separate equals inherently inferior" school of thought, any ra-
cial separation in public schools, regardless of how it came into existence,
was the evil condemned in the Brown opinion. From this perspective,
"the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation was illusory; the
91. Id. at 121; see Penick, 443 U.S. at 458; see also Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-
38 (1968)).
92. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
93. Id. at 18, 26 (citing Penick, 443 U.S. at 460).
94. See Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto! De Jure
Distinction, 86 YALE L. J. 317 (1976).
95. Reading the Mind, supra, at 317.
96. Id. (citation omitted).
97. Id. at 318.
98. Id. (citation omitted).
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black child in an all-black school in New York was no less victimized by his
isolation than the black child in the segregated schools of Mississippi."99
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, the Supreme Court disappointed in-
tegrationists who desired a pronouncement that "there is but one Constitu-
tion" and a funeral for the de facto/de jure distinction.1"' If the majority of
the Supreme Court had adopted the reasoning of the concurring opinions
of Justices Douglas and Powell in Keyes integrationist would probably have
been happy because those two Justices stated that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, when applied to public school seg-
regation cases, should not make any distinction between de facto and de
jure segregation. 101 In 1973, many integrationists, no doubt, would have
concluded that a rejection of the de jure/de facto distinction in the school
desegregation cases would result in the Green affirmative duty to integrate
unitary schools being applied nationally and would result in the elimination
of racially identifiable schools in the de facto segregated North as well as in
the de jure segregated South.'
0 2
In his concurring opinion in Keyes, Justice Douglas bluntly stated why
he thought there was no constitutional separation between de jure and de
facto segregation: because each form of racial isolation is the result of state
conduct or policies."0 3 If a "neighborhood" or "geographical" unit is ra-
cially identifiable because restrictive covenants hold back certain areas for
the "elite" while forcing those considered "undesirables" to move else-
where, state action exists under the constitution because the power of the
law supports those covenants. 0 4 That is, state action exists under the Con-
stitution when public funds are allocated by urban development entities to
create racial ghettoes.10 5 When a school district is racially integrated but
the races are segregated in different schools, black teachers are assigned
almost absolutely to black schools, the school board shuts down those
schools located in racially diverse areas and builds new schools in either
black areas or in outlying white areas, and the school board enforces a
"neighborhood" school policy at the elementary level in segregated neigh-
borhoods, state action exists.1 0 6 State action advancing school segregation
in the North is relatively different from the classical de jure type of South-
ern school segregation. Justice Douglas stated that labeling public school
officials promoting segregation as "de facto is a misnomer, as they are only
more subtle types of state action that create or maintain a wholly or par-
tially segregated school system."'1 7 When a State helps create a racial
99. Id.
100. Id. (See Diamond, Sclicol Segregation in the North: There Is But One Constitution, 7 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1 (1972)); Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at Alliens: The Fourteenth
Amendment in Xatiomvide Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 383.
101. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 214-15 (Douglas, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 215.




107. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 216 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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"neighborhood," it is a mockery of justice to regard that neighborhood as
free from the taint of state action.108 Under the Constitution, a state is
prohibited from designing racially identifiable ghettoes that decide whether
or not one is compelled to attend a certain school.109 Clearly, Justice
Douglas believed that because state action is used to advance segregation
in schools, Green's duty to affirmatively create unitary schools that pro-
mote integration should be applied uniformly without distinction in both
de facto and de jure jurisdictions." 0 In Keyes, Justice Powell, objected to
the Supreme Court's continued recognition of the de jure/de facto distinc-
tion because he believed that the de facto rationale created a situation that
impaired school desegregation in the North."'
The situation in Denver is comparable to other big cities in America
with a substantial minority population where school desegregation has not
been mandated by our federal courts.'1 2 The Court stated in Keyes that
"[t]here is segregation in the schools of many of these cities fully as perva-
sive as that in southern cities prior to the desegregation decrees of the past
decade and a half... [and] [t]he focus of the school desegregation problem
has now shifted from the South to the country as a whole.""' 3 In spite of
the South's history of foot dragging, more substantial progress in achieving
school integration has been achieved in Southern States." 4 "No compara-
ble progress has been made in many non-southern cities with large minor-
ity populations primarily because of the de facto/de jure distinction
nurtured by the courts and the accepted complacency by many of the same
voices that denounced the evils of segregated schools in the South ."115
Justice Powell said, if America is truly involved in helping those who attend
108. Id.
109. Id. at 216-17.
110. Id. at 214.
111. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 218-19 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 192. According to the 1971 Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
estimate, 43.9% of Negro pupils attended majority white schools in the South as opposed to only 27.8%
who attended such schools in the North and West. Fifty-seven percent of all Negro pupils in the North
and West attend schools with over 80% minority population as opposed to 32.2% who do so in the
South. 118 Cong.Rec. 564 (1972).
115. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 218-19 (finding that the 1971 HEW Enrollment Survey dramatized the
segregated character of public school systems in many non-southern cities. The percentage of Negro
pupils who attended schools more than 80% black was 91.3 in Cleveland, Ohio; 97.8 in Compton,
California; 78.1 in Dayton, Ohio; 78.6 in Detroit, Michigan; 95.7 in Gary, Indiana; 86.4 in Kansas City,
Missouri; 86.6 in Los Angeles, California; 78.8 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; 91.3 in Newark, New Jersey;
89.8 in St. Louis, Missouri. The full data from the Enrollment Survey may be found in 118 Cong.Rec.
563-566 (1972); Id. 219; As Senator Ribicoff recognized: 'For years we have fought the battle of integra-
tion primarily in the South where the problem was severe. It was a long, arduous fight that deserved to
be fought and needed to be won.'Unfortunately, as the problem of racial isolation has moved north of
the Mason-Dixon line, many northerners have bid an evasive farewell to the 100-year struggle for racial
equality. Our motto seems to have been 'Do to southerners what you do not want to do to yourself.'
'Good reasons have always been offered, of course, for not moving vigorously ahead in the North as
well as the South. 'First, it was that the problem was worse in the South. Then the facts began to show
that that was no longer true. 'We then began to hear the de facto-de jure refrain. 'Somehow residential
segregation in the North was accidental or de facto and that made it better than the legally supported
de jure segregation of the South. It was a hard distinction for black children in totally segregated
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segregated schools in the North rather than for perpetuating the de facto/
de jure legalism rooted in history and not contemporary reality, America
and the Court must acknowledge that the evil of operating separate schools
is no less in de facto Denver than in historically de jure Atlanta.116 I be-
lieve the de facto/de jure distinction created a North-South double stan-
dard for achieving integrated public school that has lead to the demise of
the Green unitary standard in school desegregation for all practical
purposes.
V. How THE SUPREME COURT IMPLICITLY ABANDONED ITS
"AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INTEGRATE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO
ACHIEVE A UNITARY SCHOOLS" REMEDY
By 1975, the Supreme Court appeared to simply require public school
officials to stop discriminating against students on the basis of race, and
once the state demonstrates that it is no longer practicing intentional racial
discrimination the Supreme Court will not require a state to remedy the
continuing societal effects of Jim Crow and economic discrimination, re-
gardless of the predominant racial identity of the school's student body.117
In fact, an analysis of the 1975 decision in Pasadena City Board of Educa-
tion v. Spangler reveals that public school officials do not have authority to
use race conscious remedies to promote racial integration when the current
school segregation is not the result of state sponsored or endorsed poli-
cies.11 Justice Rehnquist, while serving as a Circuit Justice for the Su-
preme Court in Pasadena City Board of Education, apparently believed
that a school could move from a century or decades of de jure segregation
to a unitary school system by obeying a school desegregation order for four
years and avoid the open-ended power of the trial judge who entered the
desegregation decree.11 9
In my opinion, the Pasadena School Board decision was a signal that
the Supreme Court was prepared to abandon the Green requirement that
racially identifiable schools be dismantled and replaced with unitary
schools that cannot be identified by race. In a 1996 law review article, one
commentator, Bradley W. Joondeph, correctly observed that the 1995 Mis-
souri v. Jenkins 2' decision by the Supreme Court represents a significant
implicit or de facto abandonment by the Court of the Green desegregation
remedy.121 The Jenkins opinion demonstrates that the Court was commit-
ted to ending all far-reaching court-ordered desegregation remedies. 22
schools in the North to understand, but it allowed us to avoid the problem.' 118 Cong.Rec. 5455 (1972);
Id. at 219.
116. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 219.
117. See generally Pasadena City Board of Educ. v. Spangler, 423 U.S. 1335 (1975).
118. Id.
119. Spangler, 423 U.S. at 1336.
120. 515 U.S. 70 (1990).
121. Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced
Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REv. 597, 598 (1996).
122. Id.
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The rationale articulated in Jenkins indicates a significant shift in the
Court's remedy for school desegregation cases. 123 Prior to Jenkins, the
Court created a presumption under its Green rationale that a previously
segregated school district had an affirmative duty to "take whatever steps
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimi-
nation would be eliminated root and branch.' 1 24 Jenkins demonstrates the
Court's hostile attitude toward the unitary school desegregation remedy
and long-drawn-out judicial management of public schools.12 5 Once school
officials have put into operation a desegregation plan, the Supreme Court
under Jenkins, unlike Green, implicitly presumes the district court should
give local school officials the power to manage their schools as soon as
possible, although the school may remain racially identifiable and not uni-
tary because the effects of past discrimination remain. 26
Jenkins demonstrates how the Court ended the era of court-enforced
desegregation.'27 While ending court enforced school desegregation reme-
dies, the Supreme Court has refused to provide an unequivocal reexamina-
tion of the constitutional theories that it provided as a justification to
impose school segregation remedies in Green or Keyes.'28 According to
Joondeph, the Court has engaged in a de facto, not a de jure, dismantling of
federal court control of historically segregated school districts.'29 Jenkins
represents the end of court-ordered desegregation. Jenkins is the ultimate
decision in a trilogy of school desegregation cases implicitly ending federal
courts supervision of school cases by the Rehnquist Court. In regards to
Board of Education v. Dowell, 3 ' Freeman v. Pitts, 3' and Jenkins, the Court
demonstrated a pattern of restricting desegregation remedies and acceler-
ating the restoration of the management of historically segregated schools
systems to local officials.
132
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have urged the Court to reject the
desegregation remedies approved by the Court in Green.'33 Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas assert that the foundation supporting the Green ap-
proach is now obsolete, and that the standards articulated in Green are not
a true and accurate interpretation of Brown v. Board of Education or the
123. Id.
124. Id. at 598-99 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968); see also United
States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972) (stating that formerly segregated
school systems must effectuate nothing less than "complete uprooting of the dual public school
system")).




129. Id. (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (distinguishing de jure from
de facto discrimination). More precisely, the Court has intentionally abandoned court-enforced desegre-
gation, implicitly and incrementally rather than candidly and definitively.
130. Joondeph, supra, at 599 (citing 498 U.S. 237 (1991)).
131. Id. (citing 503 U.S. 467 (1992)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 600.
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Equal Protection Clause.13 4 In 2008, I support the suggestion that a major-
ity of the Supreme Court has been persuaded by Justice Scalia's and Justice
Thomas' rejection of the Green desegregation remedy "but, due to Green's
symbolic importance, are unwilling to state so explicitly."' 35
The 2007 Supreme Court decision in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. I136 sends the message that school
integration is a permissible remedy as an incidental byproduct of those laws
and school polices designed to implement a goal of prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on race.
The Seattle, Washington School District had never been subjected to a
school desegregation mandate. The Seattle School Board used race as a
factor when deciding how many children of a specific race could attend a
particular school.1 37 Jefferson County, Kentucky, had a history of being
subjected to a court mandate to desegregate which ended in 2000.138 Al-
though Jefferson County was awarded unitary status by the court, it devel-
oped a race conscious plan to maintain a diversified racial balance in its
schools.139 Parents in Seattle and Jefferson County whose children were
not admitted to certain schools because of race-conscious student assign-
ments successfully filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination based on race. 4 '
On June 28, 2007, the Supreme Court held the race-conscious assign-
ment were a violation of the constitutional prohibition against racial dis-
crimination. Justice Roberts' statement in the Seattle and Jefferson
County, Kentucky cases that "the way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race" 14' represents a new real-
ity in school desegregation cases. The new reality simply means that the
Constitution will only prohibit racial discrimination in public schools, and
that public schools may someday become integrated as a byproduct of law
prohibiting discrimination, but school integration has no independent legs
of its own.
Some commentators conclude that "judicial desegregation in the U.S.
faces an uncertain future.114 2 I think the judicial fate of desegregation has
been decided by both logic and experience. For the foreseeable future, the
only thing certain about judicial desegregation is that school officials are
required to stop discriminating against students and others in education;
but the Supreme Court will not require any school to engage in compulsory
integration in order to dismantle a segregated school unless the plaintiff
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (The deci-
sion involved the Seattle School District and a case from Jefferson County, Kentucky).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2741.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2768.
142. Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III, A Re-Analysis of the Legal, Political, and Social
Landscape of Desegregation from Plessy v. Ferguson to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seat-
tle School District No. 1, 2007 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 217, 255 (2007).
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can demonstrate that a school is segregated because of an intentional gov-
ernmental purpose.'43
As all Americans debate the merits of school desegregation, a number
of contemporary black American leaders challenge the belief that all-black
institutions are inherently inferior, which they contend is the rationale for
promoting school desegregation efforts at the expense of policies that pro-
hibit racial discrimination." In Topeka, Kansas, where some commenta-
tors believed the desegregation era was created, a former black
superintendent points the finger at desegregation itself, on the 50th anni-
versary of the Brown decision, as being responsible for the poor academic
performance of many African-American students. Furthermore, "the clos-
ing of black neighborhood schools-with their traditions, yearbooks, mot-
toes, fight songs and halls of fame" took away the desire for academic
success in some African-Americans because of a loss of racial pride and
identity.
1 45
According to Professor Kimberly Jade Norwood, two considerable fac-
tors impair the academic development of Black youth: (1) societal and/or
institutional discrimination, and (2) unhealthy conduct inside the Black
community. The societal and/or institutional factors continue to in-
crease.146 The goal of Brown v. Board of Education is far from the ugly
reality of race and class separation that exist in American public education
today. 147 In 2008, America falls short of the disgusting legal standards ap-
proved in Plessy v. Ferguson. In 2008, public schools are unequivocally
separate, but clearly not equal.148 "Moreover, not only have schools re-
treated from active implementation of the goals of Brown, but even dis-
tricts wanting to continue the legacy face attack."'149 "Governments are not
spending the dollars needed to rebuild schools and educate children in non-
functioning or poor functioning school districts., 150 Professor Norwood
contends these external oppressors demand maximum preference on the
2008 civil rights agenda. 151 Professor Norwood correctly believes "that
143. Id.
144. Id. at 255. (citing STEPHEN J. CALDAS & CARL L. BANKSTON, FORCED TO FAIL: THE PARA-
DOX OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 206-07 (2007) (quoting influential black leaders in the U.S. who
have begun to question the theory of school desegregation which implies that blacks cannot receive a
quality education in predominantly African American institutions)).
145. Id. (citing David E. Thigpen, An Elusive Dream in the Promised Land, TIME, May 10, 2004,
at 32.)
146. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Blackthink'sTM Acting White Stigma in Education and how it Fosters
Academic Paralysis in Black Youth, 50 How. L.J. 711, 727 (2007).
147. Id. (citation omitted).
148. Id. (citing SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 208 (2004).
149. Id. (referring to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 127
S. Ct. 2738 (2007)).
150. Id. (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 8 N.E.2d 50 (N.Y. 2006); see also David
M. Herszenhorn, New York Court Cuts Aid Sought for City Schools, N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 21, 2006, at Al).
151. Id. at 728 (citing BEYOND ACTING WHITE: REFRAMING THE DEBATE ON BLACK STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT (2006); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS
ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004); JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION:
THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 202-09 (2006); MANO SINGHAM, THE
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even if we remedy every single external force of oppression, there will still
be internally challenging behaviors that need to be confronted.152 Societal
and/or institutional discrimination does not thoroughly explain how some
Black students do not want to be placed in advanced placement courses or
do not want to perform well in school and on school exams because of a
belief that such behaviors are acting White.,
15 3
Black America, we have a problem when we allow a significant num-
ber of African-American students in secondary education to equate aca-
demic success and scholastic achievement with "acting white." Any
student, regardless of race or class, who believes that academic success and
scholastic achievement is characterized by "acting white" should probably
stop "acting dumb."
VI. CONCLUSION
Jim Crow schools will never return to the American landscape, but I
think racially identifiable schools will remain part of the American land-
scape as long as there are racially identifiable neighborhoods. Dr. Richard
Fry, a senior research associate at the Pew Hispanic Center, contends that
the Supreme Court holdings in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. I and Meredith v. Jefferson County (Ky.) Board
of Education have created additional interest in the racial and ethnic
makeup of the nation's public schools.' 54 In the preceding 15 years, consid-
erable change has occurred in the demographics of public schools.155 The
Census Bureau reports school enrollment (public and private) was at an
all-time high in October of 2005 with approximately fifty-million stu-
dents.1 56 In 2005-06, Hispanic and black students attending public schools
were likely to have very limited contact with white students.157 In 2005-06,
approximately fifty-six percent of Hispanic students attended public
schools that were majority Latino, and the majority Latino schools only
educated merely three percent of America's white students. In the same
ACHIEVEMENT GAP IN U.S. EDUCATION: CANARIES IN THE MINE (2005); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR.,
ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (2004); JOHN U. OGBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT SUBURB: A STUDY OF
ACADEMIC DISENGAGEMENT 3-4 (2003); RONALD F. FERGUSON, TEACHERS' PERCEPTIONS AND EXPEC-
TATIONS AND THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP, IN THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 273-317
(1998); John U. Ogbu, Collective Identity and the Burden of Acting White in Black History, Community,
and Education, 36 URB. REV. 1, 17 (2004); Id. at n.71.
152. Id. at 728.
153. Id. at 728-29. "Many of these behaviors were caused by societal and institutional oppression,
but they are being sustained by the student. We have to be able to admit this and discuss this-without
accusing the messenger of blaming the victim, or labeling the messenger as an Oreo, being seduced by
oppression, or being branded an elitist out of touch with reality-if we are going to help Black youth
get off the path of self-destruction and back on the path of self-worth. Such redirection is required to
help Black youth take advantage of the academic opportunities bestowed upon them by countless free-
dom fighters in the struggle for educational equality." Id.
154. RICHARD FRY, THE CHANGING RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF U.S. PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 1 (Pew Hispanic Center August 30, 2007).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 6.
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way, half of the nation's African American students were enrolled in ma-
jority-black public schools in 2005-06, and the majority-black public schools
instructed only two percent of the white students in the United States.'58
Justice Marshall's reputation strongly suggests that he supported the
theory that the Brown decision requiring that all segregated schools be im-
mediately dismantled to achieve equality, as articulated by Green, was
mere a starting point. Although Justice Marshall joined the majority opin-
ion in Green, I am sure he would extend the requirement of dismantling
segregated schools to each and every state regardless of its historical de
jure or de facto status if he had the power to do so. 159 I am convinced that
the current Supreme Court under Justice Roberts has implicitly rejected
Green's mandate to integrate in favor of a color blind approach to school
assignment at the secondary and elementary level. With all due respect to
my hero Justice Marshall, the true legacy of Brown is an end to the enforce-
ment of the separate but equal theory by law for the purpose of promoting
segregation. Because of Thurgood Marshall's role in the Brown opinion,
America has demonstrated the political will to end intentional state-im-
posed race based discrimination in public education, but America does not
currently possess the political willpower to compel school integration wher-
ever de facto segregation exists. The Green opinion represents an attempt
by the Supreme Court to compel school integration in school districts in a
historically de jure state, which had not reached unitary status. In its 2007
decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dis-
trict No. 1, the Supreme Court's decision strongly suggests that Green is no
longer followed by the Court as a practical matter. 161 The Court's implicit
overruling of Green's goal of establishing unitary schools without racial
identification has made de facto racial segregation constitutionally permis-
sible under a uniform national standard. In abandoning Green, the Su-
preme Court relieves a school system of a duty to affirmatively create
unitary schools unless that school system is engaging in intentional state
sponsored racial segregation.
158. Id.
159. Green, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
160. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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